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RECENT DECISIONS
CIVIL PROCEDURE-PARTIES-hn:ERVENTION DENIED

WHERE

APPLICANT

AssERTS AN INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF AcnoN IN DAMAGE SuIT-ln plaintiff's
action for property damages sustained in a collision with defendant's automobile,
defendant's wife filed a petition of intervention for her claim against plaintiff
for personal injuries received in the accident. Plaintiff's motion to strike the
petition of intervention was overruled by the trial court. On appeal, held,
reversed. Petitioner's cause of action was independent of the controversy between plaintiff and defendant and did not fall within the provisions of the court
rule allowing intervention. 1 Edgington -v. Nichols, (Iowa 1951) 49 N.W.
(2d) 555.
It is commonly said that the right of a third party to intervene by his own
motion in a pending action was unknown at common law and is entirely
statutory in character.2 Therefore whether intervention will be permitted in a
particular case is dependent upon a construction of the applicable statute or
court rule. The wording of these provisions varies considerably among the
states but they may be grouped into two general categories.3 The first of these
is the broad type statute which makes an "interest in the matter in litigation"
the test for the right to intervene. The second has a more restrictive provision
limiting intervention to actions for the recovery of real and personal property.4
The Iowa rule is of the first type. A large number of decisions appear to adopt
a somewhat restrictive interpretation of this statutory language. In general,
these courts have said that the interest in the litigation which will authorize
intervention must be of such a direct and immediate character that the person
seeking to intervene will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and
effect of the judgment.5 Moreover, a number of cases have also said that the
petitioner may not introduce a new and independent. cause of action into the

1 Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, effective July 4, 1943. See 58 Iowa Code Ann. 34.
Rule 75 states, "Any person interested in the subject matter of the litigation, or the success
of either party to the action, or against both parties, may intervene at any time before trial
begins, by joining with plaintiff or defendant or claiming adversely to both."
2 Principal case at 556; Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Novotny, 200 Iowa
227, 202 N.W. 588 (1925). See also 67 C.J.S., Parties §53 (1950); 39 Am. Jur., Parties
§55 (1942).
3 For various statutory provisions see 67 C.J.S., Parties §53 (1950).
4 CLARK, ConE PLEADING, 2d ed., 420 (1947).
5 Usually the problem arises in cases in which the petitioner seeks to intervene in
actions involving claims to real or personal property. See Comhusker Electric Co. v. City
of Fairbury, 131 Neb. 888, 270 N.W. 482 (1936); Commercial Block Realty Co. v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 83 Utah 414, 28 P. (2d) 1081 (1934); Jersey Maid Milk
Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal. (2d) 661, 91 P. (2d) 599 (1939). Such a restrictive interpretation of this broad statutory language may be partially explained by the historical
development of intervention procedures. The right to intervene first received recognition
in in rem proceedings where the judgment would be binding upon all the world. For a
good discussion of the sources of modern intervention practice see 2 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 2310 (1938).
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initial controversy. 6 The decision of the Iowa court in the principal case appears
to be in accord with this line of authority. Yet the statutory language here
involved seems clearly susceptible to a broader interpretation. Some courts
have shown a more liberal tendency in this respect. Thus where an employer
sued a bonding company on a defalcation under an employer's fidelity bond,
the Alabama court allowed intervention by the employee who had a separate
agreement of indemnification with the defendant. 7 The court said the statute
was intended to expedite and economize litigation by permitting parties interested in the subject matter of the action to adjust the matter in one rather
than several suits.8 Another example of the tendency toward broader interpretation of intervention statutes is the case of Dodd v. Reese9 in which the Indiana
court construed a statute of the narrow type ( expressly limiting intervention
to actions for recovery of real or personal property) to allow intervention by
an attorney in an action to set aside a decree of adoption on the ground that
it was procured by fraud. The court held that the interest of the lawyer in
his reputation was such as to permit him to enter the action, and that despite
the language of the statute, the right to intervene is not limited to actions for
the recovery of real or personal property.10 The problem of the principal case
appears to be a novel one. 11 If it is approached with a consideration of the
Alabama court's statement that a basic purpose of intervention procedure is the
prevention of unnecessary litigation, one may well dispute the decision of the
Iowa court. It is clear that the claims of both the plaintiff and the intervenor
arise out of the same transaction and involve common questions of law and
6 Cooper v. Erickson, 213 Iowa 448, 239 N.W. 87 (1931); Steltzer v. Compton, 164
Iowa 465, 145 N.W. 896 (1914) cited in the principal case at 557. See also cases cited
in 67 C.J.S., Parties §58 (1950).
7 Franklin v. Dorsey-Jackson Chevrolet Co., 246 Ala. 245, 20 S. (2d) 220 (1944).
See annotation in 157 A.L.R. 159 (1945).
8 Franklin v. Dorsey-Jackson Chevrolet Co., supra note 7 at 248. See also cases cited
in 67 C.J.S., Parties §53 (1950). The Iowa court has also shown this tendency in some
decisions. In Reard v. Freiden, 184 Iowa 823, 169 N.W. 245 (1918), the court permitted
the intervention of general creditors of an insolvent bank into an action to cancel notes
given to the bank on the theory that the amount which would be received by the creditors
on their claims against the bank would be so affected by the outcome of this suit that they
have a "direct interest" in the litigation.
D 216 Ind. 449, 24 N.E. (2d) 995 (1940).
lO Id. at 456. This case is noted in 16 IND. L.J. 110 (1940). For annotation of cases
on such intervention by an attorney see 128 A.L.R. 574 (1940).
11 The writer has not seen any other cases dealing with the particular issue raised by
the principal case, i.e., intervention by a person injured in a car collision into an action by
one owner against the other for property damages. Professor Moore states, "A composite
=e picture illustrates the general trend as to what parties and interests will support intervention. It has been allowed to an owner or lienholder of property subject to court control;
a claimant to a fund or property in the possession of the court for purposes of administration or distribution; a person inadequately represented by a party before the court who
purports to represent him; a person in privity with a party, as a purchaser of an interest in
property pendente lite; one who may be bound to satisfy a judgment, as a principal or
surety; the attorney general in a suit involving a charitable trust; a co-respondent or an
officer representing the state in a divorce case; a subrogee." 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
2320 (1938).
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fact. 12 Indeed the court recognized that if the petitioner's claim had been assigned to the defendant prior to litigation, it would have constituted a required
counterclaim.18 Also, it is difficult to see wherein the plaintiff will be prejudiced
by the introduction of this related claim. The only issues foreign to the initial
action are those relating to the damages suffered by the petitioner. The admission of such proof would not ordinarily cause any material disruption of the
proceedings. On the other hand there are substantial interests of public policy
supporting the integration of these two causes of action. The prevention of
unnecessary litigation and a multiplicity of suits is recognized throughout our
present day procedural law as a necessity to prevent the overburdening of the
judicial system. It seems unfortunate that the Iowa court refused to take advantage of the broad language of its court rule, which could have been readily
applied toward the accomplishment of this result.
Richard P. Matsch, S.Ed.

12 This case would se~ to fall clearly within the permissive intervention provisions of
the Federal Rules. See Rule 24(b) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. 129 as
amended 1946, effective March 19, 1948,
18 Principal case at 558.

